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Cyber Warfare

Easy Prey
“Cyber warfare is just the natural evolution of conflict in the digital space. It’s politics by digital means.” - Chase Cunningham Share on X

Cyber warfare is no longer something that happens behind closed doors or in some far-off digital corner. It's happening now—and reshaping the rules of conflict in real time. Drone strikes controlled by apps, ransomware attacks on hospitals—today's battleground is just as likely to be online as on the ground. That science fiction scenario is now a critical, constant threat-the kind that affects us all globally.

I'm really excited to introduce you to Dr. Chase Cunningham. He's a retired Navy chief cryptologist with a wealth of experience in cyber operations for the NSA, CIA, FBI—and more. He's the one who pioneered zero-trust security strategies and advises top decision-makers in government and private industry. That gives him a front-row seat to how digital warfare is evolving—and what that means for all of us. He's also the author of Cyber Warfare and the gAbriel Series, where his real-world expertise comes to life in stories that are chillingly plausible.

We talk about how cyber conflict is already playing out in Ukraine, how different threat actors operate—and why critical infrastructure is such a tempting target. Chase shares practical advice on what individuals and small businesses can do to better protect themselves. We also look at what governments are doing to defend against these growing threats. That conversation is eye-opening-and urgent. You won't want to miss it.

“None of this stuff about being a harder target is rocket science, but it does require a little strategic thinking and maybe some investment.” - Chase Cunningham Share on X

Show Notes:

“What we’re seeing in Ukraine right now is honestly the future state of warfare. It’s drones, hacking, countermeasures—all rolled into one.” - Chase Cunningham Share on X

Thanks for joining us on Easy Prey. Be sure to subscribe to our podcast on iTunes and leave a nice review. 

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Transcript:

Chase, thank you so much for coming on the podcast today.

Hey, thanks for having me. This is a bit of a fanboy moment because I’ve used WhatIsMyIPAddress many times, so this is awesome for me.

That’s cool. I’m glad that I’ve earned two cents off of your visits. It’s always fun to talk to people that have used the resource over the years. Your background to me is totally interesting and fun, so let’s dive on into it.

Yeah, well, thanks. It’s been an interesting ride to get to this point.

Let’s talk about that. What is your background? What do you do, and how did you get to where you are now?

I’m a retired Navy chief. I was a cryptologist for my career. After that, I retired, and then I went and worked at NSA for a number of years. I was a contractor there doing a bunch of stuff. Also, I was lucky enough to work as a contractor at some other agencies that have three letters in their name as well. I worked at Forrester Research for a number years and put their zero trust stuff into formal practice.

Since then, I’ve just been bouncing around and helping where I can. I’ve managed to write some books in that time as well. Like I say, I’ve been blessed that I’ve been exposed to the stuff I’ve been exposed to. I regularly consult now with folks on Capitol Hill and the executive branch too.

Interesting. Don’t take this the wrong way—you don’t look like you’re a typical cryptologist. Cryptologists usually look a little bit more like me than they do you. Was this something that you were always interested in, or was it just the trajectory of your career?

It was really the trajectory of my career. I was actually lucky because when I first joined the military and the Navy, I joined as a cryptology guy. I joined as a usual mechanic. I was working on some gear and doing things that I shouldn’t have been doing to computer systems that managed some of the fuel, oil and things like that, and steam systems.

Someone found out that it was me. Luckily, instead of sending me to Leavenworth, they gave me the opportunity to change my career, and it turned out to be a good change. Again, I tell people I’ve been blessed. I’m not playing. I really got lucky.

That’s a real fundamental shift at least. I can make an argument that it isn’t, but it sounds like it’s a pretty big shift in careers.

It was an absolute change from everything that I had been exposed to. It was really weird for me because when I was getting ready to join the Navy, to this day, I still remember I had the job sheet in my hand. One was a diesel engineer, one was a foreman, and one was a cryptologist. I was like, “I like working on engines, so I’ll do the diesel thing.”

It turns out, in the Navy, I didn’t really work on engines. I was doing air conditioning, plumbing, and piping. It sucked and I hated it, but I did like the computer side because I was the one guy in engineering that knew how to do a lot of things on computers. When I transitioned over and went to code school in Pensacola, I was undergrad at every class I went into. It was fortuitous that that was something I was hardwired for in my future.

That’s always cool when people end up in something that they just have this latent talent for and can excel at. How many years did you spend doing cryptography?

Military time total was around 13 years. When I transitioned over to Fort Meade, I was there for a few years after that. I did a bunch of stuff in Pensacola. Straight up, the cryptography operational cyber side was 15–16 years.

Since then, I’ve moved more into the strategy, consultative side. I’m not doing red teaming, pen-testing, or anything like that anymore, which I really did enjoy. I guess they tell you, “You’ve got to grow up a little bit,” so I had to grow up and move out some of that.

I’m curious because you come from a military background. I feel like all my life, there’s been this discussion of impending cyber war. It’s going to change the face of how the military operates and what a war looks like. In my mind, it really seems like Russia, Ukraine is really the very first time that this is really starting to play out in the real world. Have I just been missing stuff that’s been going on behind the scenes, or is this really the first?

No, you’ve been seeing it play out in real time. Even if you go further back and go to Estonia when the whole thing happened with Russia and Estonia, that was the first shot of the Revolutionary War that happened in cyber, in my opinion. Since then, you’ve seen this evolution.

I think what we’re seeing in Ukraine right now is honestly the future state of warfare. -Chase Cunningham Share on X

I think what we’re seeing in Ukraine right now is honestly the future state of warfare. What really interests me is tangential to cyber, but the combination of methodologies between drone warfare, between electromagnetic countermeasures, between hacking and critical systems stuff. If I pictured out where warfare would be in 2050, I think you take Russia, Ukraine, and you make it sci-fi-ish, and that’s what warfare looks like.

I don’t know if it’s a good thing or a bad thing, depending on how you look at it. Hopefully, no.

I think we’ll lose less human lives, to be perfectly frank, which is good. I think if you’re a fighter pilot, you should probably be looking for another career because we’re not going to need you soon.

I guess then you’ve got AI drones, you don’t really need the pilots, and everything’s automatic, which gets a little scary.

Even the non-fully autonomous ones—and this is public knowledge, so I’m not getting myself control of classified side—there’s research and planning going on to see if you can dominate a battlefield or airspace with cheaply made—relatively in the context of government money—drones without any humans involved. It’s going to be a swarm-type of activity.

From the perspective of, will we need bomber pilots and will we need people that can fly long-range stuff, sure. But are we going to need $4 billion F-35 JSF pilots? I don’t see why we would in the very near future.

Me being the military tactician that I am, maybe there are use cases. But it seems to me just incredible that Ukraine has done so much with sub-thousand-dollar or a thousand-dollar homemade drones enough to hold back a former world superpower.

I keep up with some of the Reddit channels on this and some of the other stuff. You’ve got folks using Mavic drones dropping mortar shells down the tubes for tanks. You’ve got a multibillion dollar tank that’s taken out by somebody that spent $600 and used a crappy old piece of Chinese artillery.

I’ve seen a lot of that footage. It is absolutely crazy.

I think for me, that’s what I think the future worker looks like. It’s pretty staggering.

Let’s take a step back. Before we go down too many rabbit holes, how do you define cyber warfare?

I think cyber warfare is just the natural evolution of conflict in the digital space. I think von Clausewitz said that war is politics by other means, but I think really cyber warfare is politics by digital means. -Chase Cunningham Share on X

I think cyber warfare is just the natural evolution of conflict in the digital space. I think von Clausewitz said that war is politics by other means, but I think really cyber warfare is politics by digital means. That’s where we’re going with this. It’s the bridge between espionage and kinetic activity. You can get more on one side of that teeter-totter or the other, depending on the need.

It’s the ultimate level playing field too. This is the only space where a country like North Korea that can’t feed its people can build a nuclear program on stolen bitcoin.

They just got about $1.5 billion a few weeks ago.

There are people in North Korea that are so poor, they eat grass, yet they’ve got a nuclear program entirely funded by stolen crypto assets.

When it comes to cyber warfare—not necessarily it’s this government; let’s not go there just yet—who are the different types of players in this space?

You’ve got the non-government-specific actors, which are the criminal factions and those folks that live in areas with non-extradition treaties, where they aren’t doing stuff for the government, but are-ish. Then you’ve got the major APTs, which everyone is aware of.

You’ve also got these factions popping up around places that are like digital mercs, where they’ll farm themselves out, do an op, make some money, work for whatever government’s willing to pay, then they disappear and find someone else. They have allegiances to no one. Those are the major players in the space. They all seem to focus in different areas as well, like where their fortes are. It’s a really interesting transition.

You have people that will break into systems, then people will do stuff once they break into the systems, and you’ve exfiltrated information to people who use that.

And then they resell it to each other. They’re all this cesspool of malicious activity.

Who are the primary targets of these actors?

It depends on the actor, and it depends on who’s behind the activity. If you’re looking at stuff coming out of Europe, Russia and those areas, it seems to be more focused on closer to kinetic disruption, hospitals, healthcare, financial critical infrastructure to some degree.

Then you’ve got the others that are coming out of the APAC region, China and those areas where it’s more what you would call 3D chess players, where they’re looking at long-term infrastructure, critical systems, oil and gas, logistics, and those types of things. They’re going deeper and they go different depending on who’s running the op and what their motivations are.

We’ve talked about players. You talked about critical infrastructure. What are the different elements of critical infrastructure?

It’s a pretty broad term currently. If you put a bunch of people on Capitol Hill, the room is in fine critical infrastructure, you’ll get a weird answer. What typically is considered critical infrastructure is oil and gas, piping, water systems, healthcare to some degree.

I would argue that school systems are also critical infrastructure, but it’s not well-defined. It’s also problematic in the context of cyber warfare, that we don’t have a clear definition on what is critical infrastructure, and we don’t have legislation that says these are the things that happen, should be targeted because that’s why the bad guys are targeted.

If the local water-filtering system goes down, was it an act of war? Was it espionage? Was it some kid just goofing around? Or did the code just break?

What is that kinetic effect? I think the hospital stuff throws a wrinkle into that. Last year, the researchers published that there was something in the neighborhood of 140 hospitals in the US that were attacked during ransomware activities, and I believe the number was around 60 Americans died because they either weren’t able to get healthcare or were in the process of getting it and things went wrong.

If you step back from that for a second, you go, “Well, wait a minute. If a bunch of terrorists parachuted out of a plane in downtown St. Louis, took over a hospital, and killed 60 people, we would be guns blazing going to war. But because it’s cyber, they just go, ‘Oh, well the nerds will handle this.’” It’s a problem.

They parachute out, we know who they are, we can identify them. But if it’s this hospital, that hospital, 140 hospitals, it could have been 140 different unrelated entities.

They don’t come directly. They hop out of currently compromised systems in Belize to go to one in Canada, to go to one in Oklahoma. The attribution side is exceptionally difficult to figure out. To your point, even if we do figure it out, what’s our justification for doing anything?

It’s clear if you fire a physical round across someone’s forehead, but it’s different if you fire a digital round, as far as your legal ability to respond. -Chase Cunningham Share on X

It’s clear if you fire a physical round across someone’s forehead, but it’s different if you fire a digital round, as far as your legal ability to respond.

You know where a missile or a rocket came from. It’s a little more murky as to where the digital trail leads.

Yeah. Even if it’s a smoking gun, people at the top are still going, “I don’t know if we want to do anything.”

Is the fear that we don’t want to get into a kinetic war as a result of a digital war?

Yeah, because that’s a very real possibility. I think the best corollary to that is Secretary Hegseth basically just said recently, “No more cyber activities against Russia.” From a diplomatic perspective, I totally get it. I think it’s good to throw some water on the fire between Russia and Ukraine. However, from the perspective of letting your adversary know that giving them a free pass, that’s problematic.

Maybe this is the question you can’t answer: Is the US prepared for a digital war?

There are a lot of really good people doing a lot of really good work that are working to figure out how we would operate in the context of a full-on digital war. If you said, “Are we ready today to defend ourselves adequately and currently keep our current way of life functional?” I would say not today, and that is an issue.

There are so many factors that affect this. Cyber warfare for me is the most interesting evolution of the combat space that there has been in history. Other than the invention of gunpowder, things have not changed this dynamically in the entire human history.

Cyber warfare for me is the most interesting evolution of the combat space that there has been in history. Other than the invention of gunpowder, things have not changed this dynamically in the entire human history. -Chase… Share on X

If you see the military coming over the hill, you know what to defend and you know where to run. But if you're in the interior of the United States and your water filtration system stops working, where did it come from? Where do you go? What’s next? Really isn’t clear, is it?

Yeah. The doctrine in this space has changed too. If you’re not familiar with the CIA’s translation of a book that was written by two Chinese PLA colonels called Unrestricted Warfare, those guys basically set the future state of digital conflict out in front of us.

What’s crazy is if you go read through that book and you really plot out what’s been going on in the last, say, seven to 10 years, it’s like, “Oh, my gosh. This was almost scripted.” The things that they’re talking about that are coming should also be very concerning with people.

What do they say is coming next?

They talk about maneuvering. There’s a chapter in there that says the war god’s face has become undefined. That’s an interesting thing from the Chinese perspective of they’re saying that the goal is basically to make it where you don’t even know who you’re engaged with or why they’re there. They talk about things like data warfare, they talk about economic warfare, lawfare, all these things.

For them, the whole premise of the book is there are no laws, there are no goals. It’s just to cause enough chaos and the enemy falls in on itself. That’s a very interesting perspective because we’re a country that’s built around processes, requirements, directives, and legal issues and whatever. You throw enough monkeys into that camp and it gets really crazy really fast.

If the war is no longer about, “We want this plot of land; we want this territory,” but rather, “We just don’t want you messing around in world affairs,” those are two very, very different goals. You give enough chaos to any country within their own borders, and we don’t have to worry about what they’re doing anymore.

Part of what they also say in there that’s very precedent too is that they say that the perfect goal of this objective is to basically make it where they know the United States is a powerhouse but where the United States never engages in conflict directly, which is very interesting. You don’t want to call the big kid down to the parking lot, but you want to figure out a way to basically make him go so nuts that he can’t even bother coming down there.

Are the techniques good enough that we wouldn’t even know if it’s happening?

I think that they’re good enough on so many different levels that it is death by a thousand cuts. It’s been playing out for a while. The Chinese and the PLA specifically, or the CCP, play 3D chess. We’re lucky if we can chew on the checkerboard.

That’s not very optimistic.

Just to give you one other example, the CCP built aircraft carriers. They built three of them. One of them, they’ve called it a research vessel, and they continue to just try new things on this thing. They know satellite pictures of it and everything. This is public knowledge.

But the thing about it is they have no goal of ever putting that thing to sea, it’s literally just keeping us investigating what they’re doing on that thing and trying to build our carriers to match that capability.

Is it defense by confusion?

Yeah. The side channel of that is when you read the Unrestricted Warfare, they talk about how the US and Ronald Reagan did this to the Russians at Afghanistan, which bankrupted the Russians and caused the fall of the Soviet Union, so we taught them how to do this to us.

It’s very interesting. I assume disinformation would be significant. “Hey, we’ve created these new weapons through particle accelerators, rail guns, or whatever. We’ve figured out the technique to make them portable, and we can move them around the world. Let’s build some structures and put them on a boat somewhere.” Now the US is freaking out.

Even the stuff I was reading recently, where there was a whole thing about the CCP going to use all the data that they’ve collected and use quantum to crack that encryption. Maybe, but in the grand scheme of things, is that going to happen right now? Probably not. But it’s enough to make people freak out and go, “Oh, crap. We've got to keep up on the quantum race.”

Isn’t that where countries do best, in a sense? We’re looking at the US and Russia. We want to be the first in space because we have an adversary. We want to be the first on the moon because we have an adversary. Some really amazing, good, positive technology has come out of those events.

To go forward, that is, as we progress forward, who will be the global superpower? I would suggest that in the US, our time is limited there for a whole lot of reasons. Cyber is one of those playing fields that make that very… Share on X

To go forward, that is, as we progress forward, who will be the global superpower? I would suggest that in the US, our time is limited there for a whole lot of reasons. Cyber is one of those playing fields that make that very level. Now this is not all doom, gloom. There are plenty of great things that’s coming and we’re doing amazing stuff, but it’s just an honest assessment of where things are.

It’s good to have an honest assessment. If you don’t know where you are, you don’t know how to get where you need to go.

Right.

Clearly, there are things that the government needs to do that listeners to this podcast do not have the ability to directly influence aside from their votes and things like that. What are some of the things that the listeners can do to protect themselves or to reduce the risks to them in these types of incidents happening?

I think one of the biggest ones is if you’re a small business, you’re a home user, or those types of things, really follow some of the best practices. Don’t just be lazy with your setup and configurations. The default crap you get from the manufacturer needs to be reset—very simple stuff.

Personally, I think more people should move towards Chromebooks and move off of legacy PCs because you don’t need it, and it’s just a bitcoin miner anyway when you get hacked. Ransomware won’t run on a Chromebook because there’s no operating system. It’s that simple.

There are some very basic things people should do like multi-factor authentication. Turn it on. It just is that simple. It’s what you were saying: none of this stuff as far as being a harder target is rocket science, but it does require a little bit of strategic thinking and maybe some investment.

As we’re talking, my gears are starting to turn of like, “What would I do if I were a threat actor?” It’s like, “Hey, gee, we could launch attacks against the United States within the United States using everybody’s home stuff, and it never leads back to us because it’s all coming from the US.”

All those misconfigured thermostats and baby cameras talking to the Internet that have default password “123.”

Refrigerators with outdated OS that can’t be upgraded.

I just recently saw someone had a web-enabled bidet. I was like, why?

Because everything needs to be web-enabled.

Even what washes your heinie.

There’s only a limit as to what individuals could do. What are some of the things that governments are doing to advance cyber defense?

One of the most interesting ones is that a couple of years ago, they put a policy out; they call it Defend Forward. What that really means is that if there are indications of things that are problematic or trending towards attack, that they can start moving forward on defending that frontline, which is great.

I think some of the new leadership on the Hill is well-suited for things to actually change up the legal requirements and give people some more teeth. There are conversations going on about the definition of negligence in cyber operations, which would be very beneficial.

The government is very aware of these risks and these threats. They do have a lot of working groups like Mitre, NIST, and others that are trying to put out really good plans and guidance for it. It’s a big, giant battleship, and you’re trying to turn it with a wooden tiller, so it’s going to take time.

Do smaller countries have an advantage? Because they’re not a big, giant aircraft carrier that they’ve got to turn?

I think that some of the smaller countries have an advantage, like Israel. Israel’s probably the world leader in effective cyber operations because they’re surrounded by the adversary. They do it 24/7 and they’re really good at it. But they’re also directed from on high to do what we need to do for the purposes of defending Israel.

Some of these other countries are catching up, but in my opinion, if you want to look for a perfect example of what operational cyber looks like for a government, it’s Israel.

I suppose there’s a certain aspect of this that we need multiple countries to work together to go after the criminal organizations and the organized crime. Is that one of those things that everybody feels good about getting rid of or trying to mitigate?

It’s just like the mafia back in the day, where the mob paid people to turn a blind eye to things. You’ve got these countries where the bad guys lived there. I can’t remember the story; maybe it was in Rolling Stone or Wired, but there’s somewhere in Latvia where all they have is Western Unions and Lamborghinis, and everybody else has got a donkey and a hut, but it’s all because of cyber crime.

It’s one of those ones that everybody would say to your face that cyber crime needs to go away. However, those folks are just like the drug cartels. They’ve worked their way into lots of very high places with a lot of money.

Is chasing the money the easiest way to go after those types of organizations?

I think chasing the money makes a lot of sense because there’s a trail there. However, you throw in the anonymous bitcoin and it gets even more difficult.

Personally, I think that we should start putting a little bit of lead behind the threat. If you’re a threat actor—you take down a hospital and people die—we know who you are, and we can attribute it. I think we should just figure out how to remove you from planet Earth. That’s just my opinion.

That is a perfectly reasonable perspective to have. You attack us digitally if we attack you kinetically.

If you kill someone, that’s par for the course. I think if they did that a couple of times, people would start going like, “Whoa, wait a minute. Maybe a million dollars is not worth it.”

I guess the challenge is that still a change in politics like you were talking earlier of, do we view cyber attacks the same thing as we would someone coming across the border, attacking a base, or a military installation somewhere around the world? Right now, everybody still is in the gray area over that.

It’s many shades of gray.

I suppose it’s not the line that people want to cross either.

Because God forbid you’ll get it wrong. That’s a very valid argument for people to say. It just is going to continue to be interesting how this rolls out. Some of the new tech that keeps coming in space is not going to make it easier for the good guys.

With the nation state threat actors, do they have different approaches, different tactics, or is it, “We’re just going to use whatever resource we can get our hands on”?

No, you’ve got the nation state from the CCP and those areas. For them it’s a many-year play. They’ve worked through getting people physically in a country to put USBs in the systems to get stuff, and then they go back home on a Visa that expired and blah blah blah. It’s a whole program plan, long-term, 20, 25 year-type thing.

Then you’ve got the other side of the cyber warfare domain, where prior to the Ukraine-Russia conflict, now they’re pretty much all engaged in Ukraine and Russia. It was a crafted, targeted attack based on what was going on politically. You could almost track it by the day this happened to the Ruble. This was bad in the EU, and there’s an attack that happened somewhere over in the UK. They weren’t going for the long-term play, the 20–30 years worth of plan.

It was all just what’s going to work today.

It was a very knee-jerk reaction.

Are all eyes on Russia-Ukraine trying to figure out, this is our first learning experience of cyber warfare, drones, and we’re going to watch what happens there in order to figure out how we adapt our militaries?

Yeah. There are a lot of folks that are watching it from the strategy side of it, like trying to figure out what the battle rhythm looks like. This is the most televised and recorded war in human history, and you’re able to learn almost the geometric rate of what works, what doesn’t, where there are changes, where you could apply, or something.

I think it’s a very good time to be a US military strategist and planner because you’re getting the almost live minute-by-minute feed of what’s going on. We don’t own the IP, we don’t own that patent, so it’s going to everyone else on the planet as well.

I guess that’s the scary aspect. Whatever we’re watching, everybody else is watching at the same time.

Yeah. There are some folks that don’t play by the same rules we are. Where we will pump the brakes on something, they’ll go, shoot. We should do that.

We have a different level of acceptable casualties than some other country might.

Right. We’re fine with running out of people before bullets.

It’s awful. As this has gone relatively on the dark side, what’s the light at the end of the tunnel, the hope, the aspiration of what can happen?

The good thing is I think we’re also seeing that there are a lot of valuable capabilities that are being developed in the context of a war. To be perfectly frank, we’ve learned this over time too whether or not people want to realize that war is a good thing for innovation.

The drone side in battlefield medicine, they’re getting people that would’ve done that before in getting the medicine and actually getting them saved because they can get a drone there with a kit before they could get them on a plane or a helicopter.

The whole concept of dropping off medicine to guys in the field feels very much like video games from 10 years ago with med packs falling from the sky.

You’re perfectly right. When I was in the military, they always talked about if you got injured during the golden hour, how fast can we get you on a third to get you back to surgery or whatever?

Now, there have been videos of it where folks in Ukraine have been shot, and they fly them out a kit and tell them literally on the phone, here’s how to cut a tourniquet, and it saves people’s lives. I think we’re seeing some of that there.

I also think we’re seeing a lot of potential for collaboration in this space. We’re also learning what the definition of conflict looks like in the future, which is very, very needed.

I can see a lot of ways what has been learned through warfare in Ukraine and Russia, could be totally beneficial for society in terms of the use of drones to find people if there’s an avalanche, an earthquake or those things, floods, and you don’t know where people are. “OK, well now we’ve got a thousand drones up in the air with thermal imaging. We can find people really fast and rescue them.” Whereas before, it’s, “Well, we’ve just got to get your dogs, get out on the ground, and just start moving.”

Some of the stuff we’re doing too around identity and identification, I think, is interesting as well. We’re able to track more in real time, get that feed, and be able to respond in real time.

There’s good that’s coming out of this in the innovation side, the collaboration side, and the potential future state. It would be just like anything; there’s risk as well as reward.

And times of transition are always messy. At some point, things will stabilize, but in the meantime it will be a little panicky.

It’s ice skating uphill for the immediate future.

How much of this, and what other things do you cover in your book?

I get a lot into artificial intelligence and the rogue aspect side of AI. I did talk a lot about the NSA, I talked a lot about SEAL Team operations and special warfare, dark, underground, and those things.

I just happened to have been lucky enough to be engaged in a lot of those spaces, know a lot of people there, and have done the work in some of those groups. The book is very online with that.

The other thing I would tell people, too, is everything I wrote about is technically possible. None of it is hyperbole. None of it’s just crazy ideas. It is all very technically doable.

Will the reader be discouraged by that? A little unnerved by it maybe?

I don’t know if they should be discouraged, but definitely, for some of them, it should be a wake-up call.

Awesome. What is the title of the book?

It’s a series. The second book is out very soon. The first book is gAbrIel and the second book is vArIable. It’s a series.

Oh, fun. I assume people can find those anywhere books can be found.

Yeah. They’re on Amazon and on the other publications. I’m glad to share links with people if they are interested in getting this.

Awesome. We’ll make sure to include links to those books in the show notes and on the website. If people want to learn more about what you’re doing, how could they connect with you?

Greatest way is LinkedIn. I’m a big fan of DMs, social media, and chatting with people there, so look me up. I’m the only Dr. Chase Cunningham you’ll find on LinkedIn.

That’s awesome. It’s easy when you can find someone. It’s awful when you go to LinkedIn and you enter my name. There are 45 Chris Parkers that show up and you’re like, “Oh, great; which one?”

It’s like John Smith, yeah.

Cool. I super appreciate you coming on the podcast today.

Hey. Thank you so much, man. This was great. I could talk about this stuff for hours.

Me too.

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